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E XECUT IVE  SUMMARY
The Energy Transition is underway - more haste is needed!
In the past few years, carbon asset risk (CAR) has gone from a fringe topic discussed primarily by 
NGOs to a serious consideration of some of the largest companies in the world. Recent market action, 
LQYHVWRUSOHGJHVQHZPRGHOVDQGUHVXOWVDQGVLJQL¿FDQWVKDUHKROGHUUHVROXWLRQVDUHDOOFRQWULEXWLQJ
to pushing CAR into the public attention.1 This report discusses some of the most important recent 
GHYHORSPHQWVDQGSURYLGHVWKH¿UVWDWWHPSWDWTXDQWLI\LQJWKHXSWDNHRI&$5DVVHVVPHQWDQG
management. 
The report follows the basic structure of the recently released UNEP FI/WRI CAR Framework, 




carbon-intensive companies are exposed to (“operator carbon risk”) from the risk that is passed 
on to lenders and investors with a stake in these companies (“carbon asset risk”). Exposure and 
risk evaluation have to be done at the asset level by companies (operators of those assets) and at the 
SRUWIROLROHYHOE\RZQHUVRIRU¿QDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDULHVWRWKRVHRSHUDWRUV5LVNLVWKHQPDQDJHGXVLQJ
VHYHUDORSWLRQVGLVFORVXUHGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQGLYHVWPHQWDYRLGDQFHDQGHQJDJHPHQW81(3),:5,
had over 200 participants in the webinar launch of its Framework. 
This report now looks at the evidence for action by operators (disclosure) and investors (divestment 
DQGHQJDJHPHQWLQSDUWLFXODUWKHUHLVOLPLWHGHYLGHQFHRIDFWLRQE\¿QDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDULHVDWWKLV
VWDJHLQUHODWLRQWRWKHVHLVVXHVLQWKHIRVVLOIXHOVDQGXWLOLW\VHFWRUV,WDOVRDQDO\]HVKRZUHFHQW
market volatility, a primary risk factor in the CAR framework, may be contributing to such action. It 
focuses on evidence of action in four spheres: market action, corporate disclosure and engagement, 
and direct investor action (divestment and portfolio exposure and stress testing). We conclude 
that these developments are beginning to show progress in terms of action in an energy 
transition that now seems well underway. There is still a long way to go.
• Market Action: the past year has essentially applied a “stress test” through energy 
commodity prices of a magnitude no one could have foreseen a year ago – spot oil prices 
around $40bbl and seaborne coal prices of $50t. While these are only spot and not the 
expectations for the next 20 years they show the dynamics at work in CAR evaluation. The 
key issue is what drove these price declines. Short-term cyclical forces and geopolitics are two 
obvious drivers.  However, we also point to the following key themes that are part of the long-
term CAR thesis in terms of:
- Regulatory and technology forces in coal markets: a number of increasing 
UHJXODWRU\DQGSROLF\WUHQGVLQWKH86DQG&KLQDLQSDUWLFXODUKDYHD̆HFWHGFRDO
demand.2 Combined with technology changes in gas and renewable energy markets, 
these trends have led to a fall in US coal demand (impacting share markets) and signs 
of a peaking in Chinese coal demand.3
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- Acknowledgement of carbon constraints and a rush of cheap supply in oil 
markets: the Saudi Oil Minister has acknowledged that by 2050 the need for fossil 
IXHOVZLOOEHJUHDWO\UHGXFHGDQGWKLVKDVFRLQFLGHGZLWKDVLJQL¿FDQWSXVKRIQHZ
supply from low cost producers to markets, crashing the oil price.4
- In Europe and the U.S. utilities have been highly disrupted. Analysts have 
been concerned with the “utility death spiral” for companies in both regulated and 
restructured markets because the companies generally have not anticipated or adapted 
their business models to several factors: a combination of policies that support 
GLVWULEXWHGJHQHUDWLRQUHQHZDEOHVDQGLQFUHDVHGHQHUJ\ḢFLHQF\PDQGDWHVFKDQJLQJ
PDUNHWG\QDPLFVGXHWRORZQDWXUDOJDVSULFHVDQGQHZO\GHVLJQHGFDSDFLW\DQG
energy markets. Investors should be concerned that companies failed to predict or 
PLWLJDWHWKHH̆HFWVRIWKHVHIDFWRUVWRDYRLGORVVRIYDOXH
- At least $200bn in capital expenditures, primarily oil & gas projects, has 
been deferred or cancelled over the past year. Most recently, Shell announced 
that its $7-9 billion in capital expenditures chasing Arctic oil was unsuccessful, 
highlighting the danger of wasted capital for projects with high break-evens and long 
time frames for development.5
- Major Oil companies including BP, Shell, BG, Eni, Statoil, and Total have 
called for a global carbon price.
- Market Analysts Views Are Evolving: The number of comments and papers 
focusing on CAR related issues has rapidly increased in the last year. We 
catalogue these papers by sell side, buy side, and ratings agencies.
• Engaging with Operator/Corporate Risk Management: much of the focus by investors 




is generally obvious in the fossil fuel and utilities sector – but a deeper consideration of how 
the operator stress tests the various possibilities in an Energy transition (e.g. a 2°C policy 
outcome). 
- Proxy voting has been a key area for investors to press for more 
information from operators.6 Our data shows that a majority of investors 
supported proxy access resolutions at 23 out of 33 fossil fuel companies despite 
company opposition.7 There is ample evidence to support that under investor 
pressure, operators are addressing CAR in formal disclosure and informal 
HYDOXDWLRQVEXWQRWLQVẊFLHQWGHWDLO2XUGDWDVKRZWKDWFRPSDQLHV










VXEMHFW 	\HDU 	FRPSDQ\ 	¿OHU 	VHFWRU 	VWDWXV 	PHPR 	DOO SUR[\
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only a handful such as Conoco, Statoil, and BHP Billiton have publicly 
VXSSRUWHGWKHXVHRID'DQDO\VLVZKLFKDJDLQZRXOGEHQH¿WIURPPRUH
details, especially on capital expenditures.8  There is a general tendency to 
dismiss strong policy action and expect an extended energy transition beyond a 2D 
climate pathway.
- It is notable that the Governor of the Bank Of England has also pointed to 




lacks completeness in a risk management framework.
- Engagement can also take the form of direct dialogue with operators and 
business planning and models. This is frequently private in nature.
- One regulatory initiative of particular note is article 173 of the French 
Energy Transition law, which requires both companies and investors to 
disclose on CAR issues.
• Direct Investor Portfolio action: investors can also manage CAR directly at their own 
portfolio level, integrating some of the results of engagement. Most actions are mandate-
dependent. That is, asset owners and asset managers have to follow the set out mandates 
ranging from ethical to passive to active.
- Divestment is the most extreme form of portfolio action and can have 
GL̆HUHQWWKUHVKROGVRIDFWLRQWULJJHUV. The divestment by the Norwegian 
sovereign wealth fund of coal companies deriving above 30% of revenue potentially 
leaves 122 companies to be sold. There are nearly 400 investing institutions claiming 
some degree of disinvestment, led by foundations and NGOs, faith-based investors, 
SHQVLRQIXQGVDQGJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGFROOHJHVXQLYHUVLWLHV
- This has produced vocal responses from the fossil fuel industry. While there 
is an economic case that disinvestment does not ultimately starve companies of capital, 
Peabody has pointed to the possibility of adverse business impacts in its disclosures. 
7KHLQGXVWU\KDVFHUWDLQO\IRFXVHGRQWKHSRWHQWLDOIRU³VWLJPDWL]DWLRQ´
- Investors can use quantitative methods for testing exposure (carbon 
footprinting and stress testing portfolios for substantial carbon 
constraints) and evidence suggests this currently rare practice is growing. 
A small percentage of the large asset owner industry currently do this—around 60 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUVKDYHSOHGJHGWRIRRWSULQWWKHLUSRUWIROLRWKURXJK35,¶V0RQWUHDO
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- 5HJDUGOHVVDVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURISURYLGHUVKDYHHPHUJHGWRR̆HU
services in this area, mostly with respect to screening using carbon 
footprinting approaches. A growing number of tools are going beyond cross-
sectional analysis to include explicit scenario-based stress testing. However, currently 
“bottom-up” security-level tools are likely too complex for most investors to use 
directly, and “top-down” portfolio tools lack the security-level detail needed for stock-
picking.
- At an integrated Portfolio level Mercer have launched a top down model 
ORRNLQJDWFOLPDWHULVNVLQFOXGLQJWKHH̆HFWVRISK\VLFDOLPSDFWV.  Mercer has 
seen more than 3000 downloads of their document setting out the high level results 
ZKLFKVKRZGLYHUVHVHFWRUUHVXOWVVRPHZKDWOHVVVRDWWKHDVVHWOHYHODQGOLWWOHH̆HFWDW
the overall portfolio level when the trends are addressed proactively. 
By the Numbers 2014-15
Proxy Access
• Shareholder Control: Proxy access in U.S. for right to nominate directors focused on climate. 












• 3 fossil fuel majors support 2D scenario analysis (ConocoPhillips, Statoil, and BHP Billiton).
• 6 oil majors call for global carbon pricing (Eni, Statoil, Shell, BP, Total, BG Group).
• 2 oil majors leave ALEC (BP, Shell)
• 4 oil majors defer Arctic drilling (Chevron, BP, Statoil, Shell)
• 2 oil majors invest in renewable energy (Total and Statoil)
• 8 oil majors announce plan to engage in climate policy.
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Future Key Action metrics – much more is needed
Engagement
• Changing capital planning processes by successfully persuading companies to conduct 
transparent review of reserves and resources portfolio under 2C scenarios.
• Aligning executive compensation with creating value over volume at any cost by de-linking 
reserve replacement metrics and executive incentives.
• Highlighting public policy stances and actions of companies as compared to their statements 
about support for climate change action.
• Investor engagement with policymakers and regulators including continued public calls for 
strong climate action such as 357 investor signatories to UN calling for price on carbon, 62 
investor signatories to SEC calling for implementation of climate disclosure, and investor calls 
for strong greenhouse gas emissions standards for power plants and methane regulations.
1.  CARBON ASSE T  R ISK :  D ISCUSSION FRAME WORK :  WRI 
AND UNEP-F I  PORTFOL IO  CARBON IN IT IAT IVE10
1.1 INTRODUCTION
&OLPDWHFKDQJHSUHVHQWVHQRUPRXVHFRQRPLFVRFLDODQG¿QDQFLDOLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUHFRQRPLHV
around the world. In response, many governments have enacted, or are considering enacting, policies 
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increase deployment of low-carbon technologies.11 
Such policy actions are in turn occurring in the context of changing regional and global energy 
markets, as evidenced by recent volatility in global energy commodity prices. This has led a number 
RILQYHVWRUVDQGRWKHUVWDNHKROGHUVWRTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUORDQVRULQYHVWPHQWVLQFDUERQLQWHQVLYH
physical assets or companies could be at risk due to policy and market dynamics, separate from the 
SK\VLFDOULVNVWKDWFOLPDWHFKDQJHSUHVHQWVIRUH[DPSOHVHYHUHVWRUPVÀRRGVHWF12. 
This discussion on “carbon risk”13KDVEHHQLQÀXHQFHGE\UHVHDUFKXQGHUWDNHQE\WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Energy Agency (IEA), Oxford University, and the Carbon Tracker Initiative, among others, which 
VXJJHVWVWKDWDEVHQWFDUERQFDSWXUHDQGVHTXHVWUDWLRQRURWKHUWHFKQRORJLFDOVROXWLRQVWRPDQDJH
*+*HPLVVLRQVDVLJQL¿FDQWTXDQWLW\RIWKHZRUOG¶VIRVVLOIXHOUHVRXUFHVHVSHFLDOO\FRDOZLOO
need to remain in the ground (that is, unexploited) under climate mitigation scenarios. To take 
WKHFOHDUHVWH[DPSOHLIDODUJHTXDQWLW\RIIRVVLOIXHOUHVRXUFHVFDQQRWEHH[WUDFWHGDQGSURGXFHG
(whether because of policy, market or other carbon-related constraints), companies whose business 
is principally focused on such activities could be negatively impacted, both operationally and 
¿QDQFLDOO\7KLVLQWXUQFRXOGUHSUHVHQW¿QDQFLDOULVNWRLQYHVWRUVDQGOHQGHUVZKRKROGD¿QDQFLDO
stake in such companies, sometimes referred to as “carbon asset risk.”
7KLVUHSRUWZLOOVXPPDUL]HUHFHQWDFWLYLWLHVLQWKH&$5VSDFHDQGLPSRUWDQWO\TXDQWLWDWLYHGDWDRQ











and connect it to the remaining sections. Following this, sections discussing market, corporate, 
DQGLQYHVWRUUROHVZLOOEHSUHVHQWHGIROORZHG¿QDOO\E\DVXPPDU\RIWKHFXUUHQWVWDWHDQGIXWXUH
developments. 
1.2 SUMMARY OF WRI/UNEP FI FRAMEWORK
1.2.1 Purpose of the Framework
The dialogue around carbon asset risk has grown over time, but it has occurred in the absence of 
a comprehensive, generally accepted framework to guide institutions and other stakeholders in 
WKHLUH̆RUWVWRWKLQNFRQVLVWHQWO\DQGV\VWHPDWLFDOO\DERXWWKHLVVXH7RPHHWWKLVLPSRUWDQWQHHG
the World Resources Institute (WRI) and UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI) launched a process 
LQHDUO\WRGHYHORSDIUDPHZRUNWRKHOS¿QDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDULHVDQGLQYHVWRUVDVZHOODV
stakeholders with an interest in this topic, more systematically to identify, assess, and manage carbon 
asset risk. It represents an open, multi-stakeholder framework for discussing current events in the 
CAR space. 
1.2.2 Summary of the framework 
The framework covers the key elements of addressing carbon asset risk during the process of making 
QHZ¿QDQFLQJRULQYHVWPHQWGHFLVLRQVDQGZKHQPDQDJLQJH[LVWLQJLQYHVWPHQWSRUWIROLRV$V
VKRZQLQ)LJXUHEHORZWRSDUURZVWKHIUDPHZRUNFDQEHRUJDQL]HGDURXQGWKUHHFHQWUDODFWLRQV
investors and intermediaries can take in assessing CAR: assessing exposure, evaluating the impacts 
RIWKLVH[SRVXUHLH¿QDQFLDOULVNDQGPDQDJLQJPDWHULDOULVNV
Figure 1: Summary of Framework Structure
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7KHIUDPHZRUN¿UVWH[SORUHVW\SHVRIULVNIDFWRUVUHODWHGWRFDUERQULVN7KHIUDPHZRUNGLVFXVVHV
four core carbon risk factors that exist today—policy and legal, technology, market and economic, and 
reputational factors—that are closely intertwined and not always easy to isolate (picked up in Section 
2: Markets). 
The framework then draws an important distinction between how exposure to carbon risks 
PDWHULDOL]HVDQGWRZKLFKSDUWLHV,QSDUWLFXODUULVNIDFWRUVRWKHUWKDQUHSXWDWLRQDO14SULPDULO\D̆HFW




Of course, certain industry sectors and types of companies are more or less exposed to carbon 
risk. To date, public dialogue has focused principally on physical assets and operations heavily 
UHOLDQWRQIRVVLOIXHOVVXFKDVXSVWUHDPIRVVLOIXHOH[SORUDWLRQDQGSURGXFWLRQDQGIRVVLOIXHO¿UHG
power generation. This is a logical focus, given that these activities contribute the largest share 
of GHG emissions to the global economy and are most likely to be impacted directly by carbon 
(and other air-pollution-control) policy regimes, such as cap-and-trade programs or carbon taxes. 
Nevertheless, other sectors, such as fossil-fuel-dependent infrastructure and fossil-fuel-intensive 
industries that face competition from low-carbon competitors, may also be exposed to operator 
FDUERQULVNGHSHQGLQJRQWKHSUR¿OHRIWKHXQGHUO\LQJSK\VLFDODVVHWVW\SHIXHOPL[ORFDWLRQ
RSHUDWLRQDOOLIHWLPH*+*HPLVVLRQVHWFWKHRSHUDWRU¶VHDUQLQJVPDUJLQDQGWKHZD\LQZKLFKLW
manages the risk (termed “operator carbon strategy”). Such strategies can include factors such 
DVIXWXUHGHYHORSPHQWFDSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUHFDSH[SODQVDVVHWGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQDOULVN
PDQDJHPHQWH̆RUWVIRUH[DPSOHPHWKDQHPLWLJDWLRQ
Even for investments in sectors or companies that face high levels of operator carbon risk, 





important considerations in determining whether operator carbon risk may translate to carbon asset 
risk for an intermediary or investor.  
 
Collectively, the characteristics of investee companies (and their underlying physical assets) in a 
¿QDQFLDOSRUWIROLRGHWHUPLQHWKHSRWHQWLDOexposure to CAR. Such characteristics can thus be used 
WRVFUHHQSRUWIROLRV²WKH¿UVWVWHSLQHYDOXDWLQJ¿QDQFLDOLPSDFW²EXWDORQHFDQQRWGHWHUPLQH
WKH¿QDQFLDOLPSDFWRIWKHULVN7ZRPDLQDQDO\WLFDODSSURDFKHVFDQLQIRUPWKLVDVVHVVPHQWD
“bottom-up” operator-level approach starting from physical assets and rolling up to a portfolio, and, 
2) a “top-down” portfolio approach that evaluates the impacts of risk factors on an entire portfolio of 
investments. 
Given the complexity associated with operator-level stress testing (collecting plausible scenario 
GDWDVXFKDVWKDWH[SORUHGLQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO(QHUJ\$JHQF\¶V:RUOG(QHUJ\2XWORRNDVZHOODV
company-level risk factor data to plus into the scenario), this type of analysis is most likely to be done 
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taking into account both high- and low-carbon investments and the expected risk correlation between 
them given an assumed scenario. While such an analysis is highly technical, tools to perform such 
evaluation are emerging, though only through commercial providers. Thus, it is feasible for large 
investors to perform such modeling and some are beginning to do so (discussed in Section 4). 
)LQDOO\ZKHUHDVLJQL¿FDQWULVNH[LVWVWKHIUDPHZRUNVXJJHVWVVWUDWHJLHVWKDW¿QDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDULHV
and investors can pursue to manage carbon asset risk. The options for managing carbon asset 
risk will vary depending on the role of the intermediary or investor (for example, underwriter, 
ERQGKROGHUOHQGHURUVKDUHKROGHUDQGZKHWKHU¿QDQFLQJRULQYHVWPHQWLVXQGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQ
or has already been made. In general, though shown in Figure 2, intermediaries and investors 
have two main options—avoiding risk altogether or managing it. The options—which are of course 
LQVWLWXWLRQ²DQGPDQGDWHVSHFL¿FFDQEHVXPPDUL]HGDV³'LVFORVXUH'LYHUVL¿FDWLRQ(QJDJHPHQW
and Divestment.”
Figure 2: Risk Management Options by Investment Stage for Different Financial Sector Actors
While not discussed in detail in this report, the framework also notes that some amount of CAR is 
a byproduct of the current uncertainty about future global and regional climate policy regimes. The 
¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUFDQSOD\DUROHLQZRUNLQJWRUHGXFHWKLVXQFHUWDLQW\WKURXJKHQJDJHPHQWLQSXEOLF
policy arenas, asking for stable and predictable medium-term policy frameworks to deliver long-term 
emissions reductions goals.15 Having greater clarity on issues such as the potential nature and timing 
RI*+*UHJXODWLRQDQGUHSRUWLQJDQGGLVFORVXUHUHTXLUHPHQWVZRXOGJUHDWO\HQKDQFHWKHDELOLW\WR
assess and manage carbon asset risk. 
 /HWWHUIURPLQYHVWRU&(2¶VWR*)LQDQFH0LQLVWHUVDYDLODEOHDWKWWSZZZLLJFFRUJ¿OHVSXEOLFDWLRQ¿OHV,QYHVWRU&(2BOHWWHUSGI
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1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT




and technology risk factors often receive the most attention in CAR debates, the role of markets has 
proven paramount recently. 
Section 3 of the report then discusses the state of corporate carbon risk disclosure and investor 
engagement. Corporate disclosures often serve as both important CAR exposure screening 
information for investors as well as the raw data driving operator level stress tests (which, in many 
FDVHVDUHSUHFLVHO\WKHGDWDUHTXHVWHGE\LQYHVWRUV,QYHVWRUHQJDJHPHQWRQHRIWKHSULPDU\ULVN
PDQDJHPHQWWHFKQLTXHVLVDQLPSRUWDQWGULYHURIVXFKLQIRUPDWLRQDQGLVGLVFXVVHGLQWKHVDPH
section. Section 4 then analyses investor actions other than engagement, notably the divestment 
PRYHPHQW6HFWLRQDQGTXDQWLWDWLYHWHFKQLTXHVWKDWDUHEHLQJDSSOLHGWRDVVHVVH[SRVXUHRU
stress test CAR impacts (4.2). 
Figure 3: Layout of this report in UNEP FI/WRI framework
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2.  COMMODIT Y MARK E TS – E V IDENCE  OF  THE  ENERGY 
TRANSIT ION OR CYCL ICAL?  COAL LE ADS THE  WAY.
In many ways in the last year markets themselves have seen the biggest action for much of the 
CAR thesis – battles in supply energy markets, falling energy commodity prices, turmoil in energy 
UHODWHGVWRFNSULFHV7KHTXHVWLRQLVGRHVWKLVDWDOOUHODWHWRIXQGDPHQWDOVKLIWVGXHWRDQHQHUJ\
transition/climate constraint or is it all just cyclical. We believe that there is a fundamental peaking 
in coal demand and market dynamics, which is a function of regulation, natural gas and renewable 
energy. The Energy Transition is under full swing in this sector. Oil is more complex and there are 
undoubtedly cyclical forces at play. However even the Saudi Oil Minister can see long term carbon 
constraints and the move to dominate supply by OPEC is exactly what a climate constraint would be 
expected to produce.16
2.1 THE US COAL CRASH
:H¿UVWORRNDWWKHFRDOLQGXVWU\LQWKH8617 Between 2011 and 2014 the Dow Jones index of coal 
stocks declined 76% compared to the overall market rising by 68%. Evidence of structural change 
based on regulation and new technology in the shape of fracked gas and renewables is strong.18 
The EPA was active in relation both to clean air and climate pollution particularly advancing 
rules around Mercury but also directly in relation to GHGs. The new standards of performance 
IRUJUHHQKRXVHJDVHPLVVLRQVIRUQHZPRGL¿HGDQGUHFRQVWUXFWHGVWDWLRQDU\VRXUFHVHVVHQWLDOO\
established natural gas as the benchmark for emissions.19 The proposed Clean Power Plan is set to 
expand on that by setting greenhouse gas limits for existing facilities.20  Investors and businesses 
have played a key role in shoring up political support for these regulations.21
Underpinning this all has been the fracked or tight gas developments resulting from decades of 
research and development. The drilling technology breakthroughs in the mid-2000s produced high 
volumes of cheap natural gas that began to change electric power market dynamics as early as 2009 
and resulted in shifting load from existing coal plants and replacing plans for new coal builds.22
Renewable energy sources have meanwhile been getting cheaper and more readily available. As a 
UHVXOWWKHVZLWFKRXWRIFRDOKDVEHHQPHWIURPDFRPELQDWLRQRIJDVUHQHZDEOHVDQGḢFLHQF\
These forces represent clear examples of an energy transition from a longer-term perspective that has 
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Figure 4: The US Coal Crash
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2.2 CHINESE DEMAND 
Meanwhile at the fundamental demand level for coal, Chinese demand seems to be peaking due to 
environmental and health constraints as well as a slow down in growth – a key element we expected 
in terms of the market overestimating continued demand growth. Recent data shows total imports 
IRUWKH¿UVWHLJKWPRQWKVRIZHUHPLOOLRQWRQQHVGRZQSHUFHQWIURPWKHVDPHSHULRG
last year: 
Figure 5: Chinese Coal Imports
2.3 EUROPEAN UTILITY DEATH SPIRAL
In European terms, the coal story has played out more in relation to utilities.23 Many have performed 
poorly again from the fundamental energy transition standpoint of renewable energy being the 
dispatch of choice. The failure of utilities to adapt to this transition has led to the “Utility Death 
Spiral” syndrome. 
 6HHHJ0DWWKHZ*UD\³&RDO&DXJKWLQWKH(88WLOLW\'HDWK6SLUDO´KWWSZZZFDUERQWUDFNHURUJUHSRUWHXBXWLOLWLHV
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Figure 6: European utility share price performance versus DAX from 2008 to 2013 (2008 = 100)
Figure 7:  The utility ‘death spiral’ explained
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2.4 OIL MARKETS
The oil markets have experienced a recent return to volatility that few expected.24 Notably, one of 
the premises of the carbon asset risk initiative was that the rapid rise in capital costs as compared 
to a low rate of production growth had put the industry in a fragile position where any faltering in 
RLOGHPDQGDQGRUSULFHZRXOGSURGXFHVLJQL¿FDQWZDVWHGFDSLWDO25 The commentary of Sheikh 
1DLPLWKH6DXGL2LO0LQLVWHUKDVHPSKDVL]HGWKHHOHPHQWVRIFKHDSVXSSO\KLJKFRVWSURMHFWVXQGHU
pressure and recognition of long term carbon constraints at play.
In May 2015 Sheikh Naimi against the background of increased supply into weakening prices stated: 
“In Saudi Arabia, we recognise that eventually, one of these days, we are not going to need fossil 
IXHOV,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHQLQRUWKHUHDIWHU¶6DXGL$UDELDSODQQHGWREHFRPHDµJOREDO
SRZHULQVRODUDQGZLQGHQHUJ\¶´26
5HODWLQJWKLVWR&DUERQ7UDFNHU¶V&DUERQ6XSSO\&XUYHV2LO&DSLWDO([SHQGLWXUHV27 yields the 
following observations:
 23(&DQG6DXGL$UDELDZHUHLGHQWL¿HGDVKDYLQJWKHORZHVWFRVWVXSSO\DQGVRWKHPRVW
“climate secure” oil if demand falls more than expected due to climate and other economic 
factors. Put another way, any battle for market share would see Saudi Arabia in particular as a 
winner in the long term.
 7KHTXHVWLRQLVGRHVWKLVYHU\ORQJUXQFDUERQFRQVWUDLQWSOD\DUROHLQWKHLUGHVLUHWRVXSSO\
low cost oil, even now? Perhaps at the margin that is true.
Regardless, the return to volatility, and in particular, the return to $40-50/barrel has presented, 
to some degree, the type of stress-testing that the Carbon Asset Risk Initiative called for from 
the beginning. As a result, some of the highest cost projects have begun to fall by the wayside 
as companies scramble to identify which projects could be put on hold, whether costs could be 
renegotiated with vendors, and how much of their planned capital expenditures would need to 
be slashed in order to preserve their balance sheets and reassure analysts and investors.28 The 
&DUERQ$VVHW5LVN,QLWLDWLYHSRVLWHGWKDWXQFRQYHQWLRQDOUHVHUYHVVSHFL¿FDOO\RLOVDQGGHHSZDWHU
ultradeepwater, and Arctic drilling would be particularly vulnerable to stranding.292IFRXUVH6KHOO¶V
recent announcement that it is suspending its Arctic drilling plans after investing $7-9 billion in 
exploration costs is the most notable example of the risk of wasted capital.30 Shell knew as early as 
)HEUXDU\WKDWLWVH̆RUWVZRXOGQRWEHSUR¿WDEOHXQOHVVWKHIRUPDWLRQLWZDVH[SORULQJWXUQHG
out to be completely full of oil, but it took the gamble and invested an additional $4-5 billion that 
will never show a return.317KHLQLWLDODQDO\VLVE\:RRG0DFNHQ]LHEHORZVHHPVWRFRQ¿UPWKDW
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2.4.1 Wood Mackenzie: Pre-FID project deferrals: 200 billion boe and counting32
Finally we can show the impact of all this on expected capital expenditures – a $200bn pull back in 
the short term at least. Below we extract directly from their recent report. 
Executive summary33
By year-end we may be able to count the number of major upstream projects that 
made FID during 2015 on one hand. The dramatic fall in oil prices in 2014 and 
subsequent deconstruction of 2015 company capital budgets has by mid-year 
already resulted in over 45 major project FID deferrals. Together, these create a 
substantial hole in the industry’s investment pipeline.
We estimate 20 billion boe of reserves has been pushed back from a diverse range 
of onshore, shallow-water and deepwater developments. Combined, they represent 
over US$200 billion in potential capital spend. Projects that are technically 
FKDOOHQJLQJKDYHVLJQL¿FDQWXSIURQWFRVWVDQGRUORZUHWXUQVKDYHSURYHG
YXOQHUDEOH±RYHURIWKHELOOLRQERHLVORFDWHGLQGHHSZDWHU¿HOGVDQGQHDUO\
30% in the Canadian oil sands….
The upstream industry is winding back its investment in big pre-FID developments 
as fast as it can. This is partly because it is one of the quickest ways to free up capital 
in response to low oil prices, although this process was already underway in the 
VKLIWWRYDOXHYHUVXVYROXPH&RVWLQÀDWLRQDU\SUHVVXUHVKDYHSXVKHGPDQ\SURMHFWV
into economically marginal territory and operators are now reworking costs and 
development solutions to achieve their hurdle rates.
Figure 8: Wood Mackenzie Deferred Oil Projects
32 June 2015.
33 ,WDOLFL]HGWH[WDQG¿JXUHVDUHXVHGZLWKSHUPLVVLRQIURP:RRG0DFNHQ]LH
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Figure 9: Deferred Resources
2.4.2 Oil and Gas companies support Carbon price.
$VPDUNHWIRUFHVKDYHFUHDWHGVLJQL¿FDQW¿QDQFLDOKHDGZLQGVIRUIRVVLOIXHOFRPSDQLHVDQG
momentum towards the Global Conference of Parties in Paris has grown, six major European 
integrated oil and gas companies have joined together to issue a call for carbon pricing.34 The 
following letter was sent by the CEOs of six major European oil companies to the United Nations 
indicating their support for a global price on carbon. Many commentators believe this move should 
EHVHHQLQDPDUNHWFRQWH[WZKHUHJDVLQSDUWLFXODULV¿JKWLQJIRUPDUNHWVKDUHLQSRZHUPDUNHWVLQ
relation to coal.  Aside from embracing a policy that will be especially detrimental to coal, the letter 
also seems to indicate a continuing divide among European and North American integrated majors 
as to what role they should play in global climate discussions. Chevron and Exxon were approached 
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Dear Excellencies, 
Climate change is a critical challenge for our world. As major companies from the oil & gas sector, 
we recognize both the importance of the climate challenge and the importance of energy to human 
life and well-being. We acknowledge that the current trend of greenhouse gas emissions is in 
excess of what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says is needed to limit the 
temperature rise to no more than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. The challenge is how to 
meet greater energy demand with less CO2. We stand ready to play our part. 
Our companies are already taking a number of actions to help limit emissions, such as growing 
WKHVKDUHRIJDVLQRXUSURGXFWLRQPDNLQJHQHUJ\ḢFLHQF\LPSURYHPHQWVLQRXURSHUDWLRQVDQG
products, providing renewable energy, investing in carbon capture and storage, and exploring 
new low-carbon technologies and business models. These actions are a key part of our mission to 
provide the greatest number of people with access to sustainable and secure energy. 
For us to do more, we need governments across the world to provide us with clear, stable, long-
term, ambitious policy frameworks. This would reduce uncertainty and help stimulate investments 
in the right low carbon technologies and the right resources at the right pace. 
We believe that a price on carbon should be a key element of these frameworks. If governments 
DFWWRSULFHFDUERQWKLVGLVFRXUDJHVKLJKFDUERQRSWLRQVDQGHQFRXUDJHVWKHPRVWḢFLHQWZD\V
of reducing emissions widely, including reduced demand for the most carbon intensive fossil fuels, 
JUHDWHUHQHUJ\ḢFLHQF\WKHXVHRIQDWXUDOJDVLQSODFHRIFRDOLQFUHDVHGLQYHVWPHQWLQFDUERQ
FDSWXUHDQGVWRUDJHUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\VPDUWEXLOGLQJVDQGJULGVR̆JULGDFFHVVWRHQHUJ\
cleaner cars and new mobility business models and behaviors. 
Our companies are already exposed to a price on carbon emissions by participating in existing 
carbon markets and applying ‘shadow’ carbon prices in our own businesses to test whether 
investments will be viable in a world where carbon has a higher price. 
<HWZKDWHYHUZHGRWRLPSOHPHQWFDUERQSULFLQJRXUVHOYHVZLOOQRWEHVẊFLHQWRUFRPPHUFLDOO\
sustainable unless national governments introduce carbon pricing even-handedly and eventually 
enable global linkage between national systems. Some economies have not yet taken this step, and 
this could create uncertainty about investment and disparities in the impact of policy on businesses. 
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Christiana Figueres, the Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UHVSRQGHGE\DVNLQJWKHFRPSDQLHVWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQGHWDLOHGRSHQFDUERQSULFLQJGLDORJXHV
FRPPLWWRFRQVLVWHQWJRYHUQPHQWHQJDJHPHQWIRFXVHGRQVXSSRUWLQJDORQJWHUPSROLF\IUDPHZRUN
and (3) plan for long term scenarios consistent with an orderly transition to low carbon forms of 
energy.36  It remains to be seen whether the companies will follow through on all aspects. Investors 
have also been active in calling on companies to engage positively in climate dialogues.37
2.5 SELECTION OF MARKET ANALYST RESEARCH PAPERS.
CAR and Climate Change: Sell-Buy side analysts, Rating agencies, Consulting Actuaries and Investors 
2013- to date.
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3.  ENGAGEMENT,  D ISCLOSURE AND SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSALS
Engagement with asset operators/companies can take many forms but the most important in relation 
to Carbon Asset Risk (CAR) are simply:
• Asking a company to disclose more information – this could be in regulatory form but 
IUHTXHQWO\LQPRUHLQIRUPDOLQIRUPDWLRQDOGLVFXVVLRQSLHFHVDQG
• Asking a company to change its practices.
The key initiators of engagement have been:
• Investors themselves, and 
• NGOs either on their own behalf or on behalf of investors as members.
These actions can proceed through two primary channels:
• Engaging directly with the company, via mechanisms such as the shareholder proposal 
SURFHVVDQG
• Engaging directly with policymakers and regulators to, for example, seek improved disclosure 
or establish and implement relevant policy changes.  
Because information obtained in direct one on one engagement with corporations may not be in 
the public domain, we focus on the more public aspects of engagement surrounding CAR, especially 
through NGOs. A critical focus of shareholder engagement has been to have companies disclose 
FDUERQDVVHWULVNVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDGHJUHHVFHQDULR,QUHVSRQVHWRWKRVHH̆RUWV&RQRFR3KLOOLSV
and Statoil have endorsed the use of 2 degree scenario analysis, but have not released the 
PHWKRGRORJ\RUPRGHOLQJDVVXPSWLRQVEHKLQGWKRVHDVVHVVPHQWV%+3%LOOLWRQEHFDPHWKH¿UVW
major fossil fuel company to disclose some of the details behind its analysis of multiple 2 degree 
scenarios on September 29, 2015.38:KLOH%+3%LOOLWRQ¶VDQDO\VLVUHSUHVHQWVUHDOIRUZDUGSURJUHVV
LWZRXOGEHQH¿WIURPDGGLWLRQDOGHWDLOUHJDUGLQJKRZWKHFRPSDQ\ZLOOLQFRUSRUDWHWKHDQDO\VLVLQWR
its capital planning processes and which types of resources and projects are most vulnerable to these 
low demand scenarios. None of the other oil, gas, coal, or utility majors has disclosed the results of 
such an analysis on the viability of their reserve and resource portfolios, though some have begun to 
consider it internally. This is a tremendous departure from earlier responses to the CAR Initiative 
that simply dismissed the feasibility of achieving the 2 degree goal. Now, Statoil has not only stated 
that “the 2 degree target is possible,” but it has laid out a potential pathway to achieving it.39 
3.1 BACKGROUND
(QJDJHPHQWRQ&$5VWDQGVRQWKHVKRXOGHUVRIERWKIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDOGLVFORVXUHH̆RUWV&'3
has developed the largest collection globally of self reported climate change disclosures and has 
UHFHQWO\H[SDQGHGLWVFOLPDWHVXUYH\WRLQFOXGHVXSSOHPHQWDU\TXHVWLRQVUHODWHGWRFDUERQDVVHW
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the World Resources Institute and World Business Council on Sustainable Development created the 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) that has set the standard globally for measuring, managing 
and reporting greenhouse gas emissions.41 
Past regulatory developments have also fed the CAR initiative.  In the United States, Ceres has 




risks and opportunities for companies in a variety of sectors, and those issues, when material, must 
EHGLVFORVHGLQ6(&¿OLQJV42   
Building upon these steps, member-based NGOs have sought additional detail from the fossil fuel 
sector.  For example, in December 2014, the Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change, led by 
IIGCC and Ceres, developed a document outlining the key disclosures sought during company 




have downplayed or given short shrift to such risks in government-mandated reporting while 
elaborating on them in voluntary reporting forms in order to increase their score or ranking.44 
These discrepancies were highlighted in recent correspondence to the SEC by Ceres and CTI as an 
LQGLFDWLRQWKDWIRVVLOIXHOFRPSDQLHVDUHQRWPHHWLQJWKHFXUUHQWUHSRUWLQJUHTXLUHPHQWV45  Although 
more work is needed, it appears that regulators are at least listening to the concerns.  
Here, we focus on several critical NGO and investor-led engagements, starting with CAR letters 
VHQWWRRLOJDVFRDODQGXWLOLW\FRPSDQLHVLQIROORZHGE\VKDUHKROGHUSURSRVDOV¿OHGLQ
VXEVHTXHQW\HDUV:HWKHQGLVFXVV&DUERQ7UDFNHU¶VLQGHSWKHQJDJHPHQWZLWKUHVSRQVHVIURP















24 | WWW.CERES.ORG 
3.2 INVESTOR ENGAGEMENT:  CERES AND IIGCC REVIEW OF INVESTOR ENGAGEMENT47 
While investors have for years been engaging with companies on the risks from climate change, 2013 was 
a watershed year when over 75 investors representing more than $3.5 trillion in assets issued letters to 45 
RIWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWRLOJDVFRDODQGHOHFWULFXWLOLW\FRPSDQLHV48 calling on them to assess and disclose the 
potential exposure they faced to carbon asset risk.497KLVLQYHVWRUOHWWHUZDVWKH¿UVWVWHSRIWKH&DUERQ$VVHW
5LVN,QLWLDWLYHDQGKDVOHGWRDVXVWDLQHGHQJDJHPHQWFDPSDLJQRUJDQL]HGE\&HUHVDQG,,*&&DQGVXSSRUWHG
through collaboration with Carbon Tracker. 
The goals of the CAR Initiative were ambitious but straightforward: 
1. To prevent shareholder capital from being wasted on developing high-carbon and high-cost fossil 
fuel reserves that are “unburnable” if the world is to avoid catastrophic climate change or may prove 
XQHFRQRPLFLISULFHVGHFOLQHDQG
2. To drive fossil fuel companies to acknowledge and plan for the escalating physical impacts of climate 
change such as higher temperatures, rising seas and stronger storms.
7KHUDQJHDQGTXDOLW\RIUHVSRQVHVYDULHGJUHDWO\VRPHFRPSDQLHVZHUHVSXUUHGWRWDNHSRVLWLYHactions and 
stake out meaningful positions in response to the initial letters:













BG Group • Explained that it has a ‘group-wide GHG target which applies to our equity-share emissions from all assets 
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6WHSSLQJEDFNIURPWKHGHWDLOVRIHDFKFRPSDQ\¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRIFDUERQDVVHWULVNVWKHOHWWHUVHYLQFHG
DQHPHUJLQJWUHQGLQIRVVLOIXHOFRPSDQLHVIURPGL̆HUHQWVHFWRUVGHYHORSLQJGLVWLQFWSRVLWLRQVRQ




source of carbon dioxide emissions and the most likely fossil fuel to be stranded.  At the same time, 
these companies pointed to their ability to shift towards natural gas to reduce their “carbon intensity” 
DQGWDNHXSFRDO¶VPDUNHWVKDUHLQWKHSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQVHFWRUDVWKHSULPDU\UHDVRQWKDWWKH\ZRXOG
not see major stranding.59 
Shareholders followed up on the more than 20 responses investors received to their carbon asset risk 
letters with formal shareholder proposals to the companies, to be voted upon at their annual general 
meetings.  In the U.S., shareholders conducted a three-pronged approach.  
First, they added the “Carbon Asset Risk” resolution to the several climate change-related resolutions 
DOUHDG\EHLQJR̆HUHGDWIRVVLOIXHOFRPSDQLHV60  While there is some variation amongst these 
UHVROXWLRQVWKH\W\SLFDOO\IRFXVRQWKH¿QDQFLDOULVNVIDFHGE\WKHFRPSDQ\LQDQ\VFHQDULRLQZKLFK
WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\UHFRJQL]HGJRDORIOLPLWLQJZDUPLQJWR&LVDSSUR[LPDWHG7KHYDVWPDMRULW\
of these resolutions have been allowed by the SEC, suggesting that resolutions pertaining to risks 
ÀRZLQJIURPWKHLPSRUWDQWSROLF\WDUJHWRIOLPLWLQJZDUPLQJWRQRPRUHWKDQ&DUHSHUIHFWO\
acceptable.  The carbon asset risk resolution has now been placed on the proxy ballot at over 20 
FRPSDQLHVLQPDQ\FDVHVUHFHLYLQJPRUHWKDQVKDUHKROGHUDSSURYDO²DYHU\VLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHU
IRUVKDUHKROGHUDSSURYDOVWKDWKDYHEHHQXQDQLPRXVO\RSSRVHGE\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VERDUG
The most notable response to these resolutions came from ExxonMobil. At the end of 2013, Arjuna 









BHP Billiton • Recognized that the world must pursue:57
- Limiting climate change to the lower end of the IPCC emission scenarios in line with current 
international agreements;
- Providing access to the affordable energy required to continue economic growth;
- Implementing a price on carbon in a way that addresses competitiveness concerns and achieves lowest 
FRVWHPLVVLRQVUHGXFWLRQV
Exxaro • Accepted the IPCC assessment of climate change and asserted its goal of becoming carbon through a 
range of initiatives including:58
- Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) for coal plants
 (QHUJ\HI¿FLHQF\WKURXJKRXWLWVRSHUDWLRQV
- Co-generation power plants
- Wind energy projects
- Management of climate impacts through increased resilience
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these groups, ExxonMobil agreed to conduct and issue a report assessing its vulnerability to carbon 
asset risk. Exxon released the report on March 31, 2014.61 Though the conclusions Exxon reached 
were at odds with the premises of the CAR Initiative, largely due to its refusal to consider a 2C 
VFHQDULRDVDSRVVLELOLW\WKLVUHSUHVHQWHGDVLJQL¿FDQWGHSDUWXUHIRU([[RQIURPLWVXVXDOVWUDWHJ\RI
setting its own terms for the debate.62)RUWKH¿UVWWLPHDPDMRU²LQPDQ\SHRSOH¶VPLQGWKHPDMRU²
LQWHJUDWHGRLODQGJDVFRPSDQ\ZDVHQWHULQJLQWRWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQRQLQYHVWRUV¶WHUPVDQGSURYLGLQJ
new insight into the assumptions that drive its business decisions.
Second, investors have begun to highlight the need to change the executive compensation structures 
at fossil fuel companies focusing on compensation schemes which reward reserve replacements of 
HYHQWKHKLJKHVWFRVWFDSLWDOSURMHFWV,QUHVSRQVHWRLQYHVWRUH̆RUWVE\,,*&&PHPEHU0DWWKHZ
Crossman of Rathbone Greenbank, Shell made some adjustment to its executive compensation 
structure. In its 2014 executive remuneration report, Shell announced that the long-term incentive 
program performance measures would be altered and that “[f]or awards from 2014 onwards, the 





 ‘adopt a policy that it will not use ‘reserve additions,’  ‘reserve 
replacement ratio’ (‘RRR’) or any other metric based on reserves 
to determine the amount of any senior executive’s incentive 
compensation without adjusting reserves to exclude barrels of oil 
equivalent that are not economically producible under a Demand 
Reduction Scenario in which the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil 




resolution received only 5.8% of shareholder votes in 2015, it remains to be seen whether, in light 
of the persistent low oil price environment, investors are not more concerned about the practice of 
rewarding executives for replacing reserves with barrels of oil that are more costly than prevailing 
market prices.
7KLUGLQDQH̆RUWOHGE\WKH1HZ<RUN&LW\&RPSWUROOHU¶V2̇FHDQGFRRUGLQDWHGZLWK&HUHV,1&5
shareholders in U.S. companies have sought the ability to nominate their own candidates for the 
ERDUGDQGKDYHWKRVHFDQGLGDWHVDGGHGWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSUR[\IRUYRWLQJSXUSRVHV7KLV³SUR[\
DFFHVV´FDPSDLJQZDVWDUJHWHGDWFRPSDQLHVWKDWZHUHGH¿FLHQWLQRQHRUPRUHRIWKUHHDUHDV²RQHRI
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The campaign was immensely successful this past year.  23 of 33 resolutions that went to a vote 
at fossil fuel companies received more than 50% support—an unprecedented level of support 
FRQVLGHULQJWKDWLQYLUWXDOO\DOORIWKRVHLQVWDQFHVWKHFRPSDQLHV¶ERDUGVUHFRPPHQGHGDJDLQVW
the resolutions.65 Notably, Apache Energy Corporation, one of the energy companies that has been 
most engaged with investors over a sustained period of time, supported the proxy access resolution 
demonstrating just how important long-term engagement can be in moving companies.66
$OLVWRIWKHFDUERQDVVHWULVNSUR[\DFFHVVDQGFDUERQDVVHWULVNUHODWHGUHVROXWLRQV¿OHGWKHSDVW
WZR\HDUVVHH$SSHQGL[VXJJHVWVERWKLQFUHDVLQJFRQFHUQIURPLQYHVWRUVDVWRWKH¿QDQFLDO
implications of climate change and a willingness to call for fundamental changes to company strategy 
for thriving in a carbon-constrained world.
Engagement of investors with fossil fuel companies on climate and carbon asset risk in the U.S. has 
increased over the past two years as shown by the following table, which includes the total number 
UHVROXWLRQV¿OHG67
Figure 12: Proxy Resolutions
Increased entrenchment from some of the North American fossil fuel companies this past proxy 
season show a need for even more coordinated action during the 2016 proxy season.
Similar resolutions have met with even greater success in Europe.  European investors, supported 




BP, and Statoil and received more than 98% approval from shareholders.69   Although the “Aiming for 
A” resolutions were endorsed by company management, this endorsement may be suggestive of the 
growing recognition within some corners of the fossil fuel sector that a broad range of shareholders 
are genuinely concerned about carbon asset risks.  The “Aiming for A” resolutions asked the 
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Climate resolutions 110 150 167




CAR resolutions 5 13 15




• Public Policy engagements on climate issues.
It is no coincidence that these three companies were also among the six European majors who joined 
together to send a letter to the UN voicing their support for global carbon pricing mechanisms and 
among the eight oil companies who will be meeting in Paris this month to discuss their plans to 
HQJDJHRQFOLPDWH0DQ\KDYHFULWLFL]HGHQJDJHPHQWVWUDWHJLHVIRUIRFXVLQJRQGLVFORVXUHVKRZHYHULW
is clear that engagement has resulted in real, substantive actions on the ground including cancellation 
of risky, costly projects. Three prime examples of actions that go beyond disclosure are included 
below:
Statoil provided one of the most detailed responses to the initial CAR letter and has a history of 
engaging with shareholders on sustainability issues at the highest levels of the company. In September 
2014 after extensive engagement with Mercy Investment Services and Boston Common Asset 
Management, Statoil deferred the Corner oil sands project in Alberta for at least three years and 
DQQRXQFHGWKDWLWZRXOGEHUHYLHZLQJDOORILWVSURMHFWVDQGSULRULWL]LQJRQO\WKHPRVWFRPSHWLWLYH70 
,Q6WDWRLOFKRVHDQHZ&(2(OGDU6DHWUHZKRSUHYLRXVO\VHUYHGDVWKHKHDGRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
renewable energy group.71 Statoil also announced that it would defer plans for Arctic drilling.72 In 








reporting rules. The sensitivity table provides investors with important data on the risk to reserve 
value for a broader range of oil prices.
Of the North American majors, only ConocoPhillips has publicly endorsed the use of scenario planning 
that includes an analysis of three scenarios that would result in a 50% chance of limiting global 
average temperature rise to 2C. According to ConocoPhillips: “We have integrated carbon-restricted 
scenarios into the strategic portfolio planning process to test our portfolio, and have developed annual 
GHG price forecasts for companywide use in long-range planning and project evaluation.”75 However, 
ConocoPhillips has not disclosed how it uses these scenarios to inform capital planning decisions and 
has not publicly disclosed information about the methodologies and assumptions used to develop the 
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BHP Billiton has issued one of the most detailed analyses to date on the potential impacts that 
PXOWLSOHGHJUHHVFHQDULRVFRXOGKDYHRQLWVSRUWIROLR%+3%LOOLWRQ¶VUHSRUWUHSUHVHQWVDVLJQL¿FDQW
VWHSIRUZDUG$OWKRXJK%+3%LOOLWRQFRQFOXGHVWKDWLWZLOOQRWVHHVLJQL¿FDQWDVVHWVWUDQGLQJWKH
reasoning behind that conclusion represents a sea change from the premise relied upon by Exxon 
and Shell in earlier responses. Instead of dismissing any possibility of achieving the globally agreed 
XSRQGHJUHHWDUJHW%+3%LOOLWRQUHFRJQL]HVWKDWZDVWHGFDSLWDOLVDWKUHDWDQGHVVHQWLDOO\FRPPLWV
to adjust its allocation of capital expenditures to address the kinds of triggers and events that create 
carbon asset risk to mitigate any damage to its portfolio of reserves and resources.76 
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(̆RUWVOLNHWKRVHSXWIRUZDUGE\&RQRFR3KLOOLSV6WDWRLODQG%+3%LOOLWRQSURYLGHYDOXDEOH
information, but they would be strengthened by providing more insight into the methodologies used 
to develop the 2 degree scenarios.  Revealing the details behind the development of these scenarios 
would advance understanding of additional pathways for reaching the 2 degree target as well as 
provide an opportunity to check the inputs against current trends and forecasts. Without information 







conversation about pathways to achieving the 2 degree target. 
3.3 CARBON TRACKER’S ENGAGEMENT WITH OIL AND GAS COMPANY ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE RISK 
The increase in engagement by investors has also led to additional analysis from informational 
intermediaries like Carbon Tracker.  As one of the leading public voices in the debate, it is interesting 
WRFRQVLGHUWKHJURZWKDQGRYHUDOOUHDGHUVKLSLQ&DUERQ7UDFNHU¶VZRUN7KH¿JXUHEHORZVKRZVWKH
breakdown of nearly 350,000 website views over a 15 month period of May 2014-August 2015. 
Figure 14`: Carbon Tracker Website Access Data
In addition to public education, Carbon Tracker has been heavily involved in engaging fossil fuel 
companies on disclosures as well. As noted above, in March 2014, ExxonMobil published two 
GRFXPHQWVUHVSRQGLQJWRVKDUHKROGHUUHTXHVWVIURP$UMXQD&DSLWDO$V<RX6RZDQGWKH&KULVWRSKHU
Reynolds Foundation for how it was addressing CAR.  On May 16th, 2014 Royal Dutch Shell issued a 
SXEOLFOHWWHUµLQUHVSRQVHWRHQTXLULHVIURPVKDUHKROGHUVUHJDUGLQJWKHµFDUERQEXEEOH¶RUµVWUDQGHG
DVVHWV¶LVVXH¶
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7KHHQJDJHPHQWLWVHOIZDVDSRVLWLYHGHYHORSPHQWWKRXJK&DUERQ7UDFNHULGHQWL¿HGVHYHUDO
shortcomings in the analysis that limited the usefulness of the disclosures for investors and published 
responses. The issues discussed below highlight the points that cause analysts to raise a risk premium 
ÀDJRYHUWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSRVLWLRQVWKHFRPSDQ\LVWDNLQJ7KHVHGH¿FLHQFLHVZHLJKLQIDYRURI
IXUWKHUGLVFORVXUHVWRFODULI\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VYLHZV
Below, are some of the key issues Carbon Tracker focused on in responding to Royal Dutch Shell and 
ExxonMobil.77&DUERQ7UDFNHU¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHVHGLVFORVXUHVFOHDUO\GHPRQVWUDWHVWKHLPSRUWDQFH
of having a dialogue in which assumptions and methodologies can be examined and corrected or 
supplemented.  
A.  Shell and Exxon address the risk of asset stranding, but dismiss it by largely focusing on the proven 
reserve base.  
Shell does not believe that any of its proven reserves will become 




or will become “stranded”.
—ExxonMobil
It is promising that both Shell and Exxon focused on the risk of stranded assets, but they focused 
largely on proven reserves, depriving the market of an analysis of how a low-demand scenario would 
impact their resource base.
,QWKHLUUHVSRQVHVERWK6KHOODQG([[RQGH¿QHFDUERQDVVHWULVNDVLILWUHIHUUHGWRSURYHQ
reserves only.  This approach looks at a static snapshot of a given company which disguises the risk, 
since an ongoing “business as usual” re-investment program merely transfers value from “low carbon 
risk” proven reserves to future resources. Value will only be preserved – and stranded assets avoided 
±LIWKHFDVKÀRZIURPWRGD\¶VSURYHQUHVHUYHVLVQRWUHGHSOR\HGWRQHZUHVRXUFHV%XWWKDWLVQRW
the way that oil companies are run. They are dynamic entities that continuously reinvest a material 
SURSRUWLRQRIFDVKÀRZEDFNLQWRWKHJURXQG
B.  Shell and Exxon suggest that even low-carbon scenarios require future investments, but provide little 
analysis of the delta between their planning scenarios and low-carbon scenarios.
The world will continue to need oil and gas for many decades to come, 
supporting both demand, and oil & gas prices. As such, we do not 
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The IEA in its World Energy Outlook 2013 examined production of 
OLTXLGVIURPFXUUHQWO\SURGXFLQJ¿HOGVLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDGGLWLRQDO
investment, versus liquids demand, for both their lead “New Policies 
Scenario” and for a “450 Scenario.” As shown in the chart above, in 
ERWKVFHQDULRVWKHUHUHPDLQVVLJQL¿FDQWOLTXLGVGHPDQGWKURXJK
2035, and there is a need for ongoing development and investment. 
Without ongoing investment, liquids demand will not be met, leaving 
the world short of oil.
—ExxonMobil
Carbon Tracker agrees with much of this analysis as most energy demand forecasts show that some 
OHYHORIIRVVLOIXHOSURGXFWLRQZLOOEHUHTXLUHGLQWKHIXWXUHHYHQLQDORZFDUERQVFHQDULRJLYHQ
natural decline rates. However, the level of investment will clearly be lower in (say) a 450 scenario 
ZKHQFRPSDUHGWR([[RQ¶V³EXVLQHVVDVXVXDO´VFHQDULR&DSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUHUHTXLUHPHQWVZLOOEH
similarly lower. Companies that continue to invest at the levels needed for “business-as-usual” run 
the risk of seeing their returns fall as prices react to weaker demand.  Here, the risk that companies 
QHHGWRFRQVLGHULVZKDWKDSSHQVWRSULFLQJLQDPDUNHWWKDWWXUQVWRVHFXODUGHFOLQHDVFKDUDFWHUL]HG
by a low-carbon scenario. 
The box below looks at an analysis carried out by Carbon Tracker in Blueprint: Managing corporate 
risk from an energy transition: an oil and gas focus 2015.79
 &DUERQ7UDFNHU,QLWLDWLYH³7KH)RVVLO)XHO7UDQVLWLRQ%OXHSULQW´$SULODYDLODEOHDWKWWSZZZFDUERQWUDFNHURUJUHSRUWFRPSDQ\EOXHSULQW
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Figure 15: ExxonMobil’s scenario exceeds the NPS CO2 emissions trajectory
Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2014; ExxonMobil, 2015, Outlook for Energy; Shell, 2013, New Lens Scenarios80 
C.  Shell and Exxon contend that their risk assessment programs consider the relevant issues, but their 
disclosures raise additional questions.  
Each of the foregoing arguments from Shell and Exxon suggested potential gaps in their approach 
to carbon risk.  However, both Shell and Exxon do disclose some steps they have taken, including 
establishing price bands for project screening and associating a carbon cost with the production of 
WKHLUSURGXFWV:KLOHWKHVHGLVFORVXUHVSURYLGHVRPHYDOXHWRLQYHVWRUVWKH\DOVRUDLVHTXHVWLRQV
about the basics of how these risk assessment tools are actually employed.  Additionally, the screens 
R̆HUHGVXJJHVWWKDWWKHFRPSDQLHVPD\QRWEHVWUHWFKLQJWRWHVWWKHLUDVVHWVDJDLQVWWKHULVNRIDORZ
carbon energy transition.    
+HUHWKHGLVFORVXUHVE\6KHOODQG([[RQGL̆HUVOLJKWO\VRZHGLVFXVVWKHPVHSDUDWHO\
The energy industry has for decades been exposed to the sorts of 
fundamental business risks outlined in your letter.  These range 
from, but are not limited to, regulatory risks, price risks to project 
performance and competitiveness. Shell has a framework in place 
when making new investment decisions that is designed to evaluate 
the extent to which all of our projects are exposed to these various 
risks.... For price risks we use a project screening value of $70 to $110 
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6KHOO¶VGLVFORVXUHRILWVVFUHHQLQJUDQJHZDVKHOSIXOWRLQYHVWRUVE\SURYLGLQJWKHUDQJHRISRWHQWLDO
SULFHVFRQVLGHUHG%XWLWDOVRUHYHDOHGWKDWGHVSLWH6KHOO¶VGHFDGHVRIH[SHULHQFHZLWKFRPPRGLW\
market risks, it was not using prices below $70 to screen projects.  That the oil price fell below 
the screening range within twelve months is worrying. It may be that Shell did look at a $45-60 
scenario as well but without knowing the probability that Shell assigned to this range, it is not of 
much help to investors.  As Carbon Tracker noted in the Blueprint, the range of variables needs to 
EHUHDOLVWLF6KHOO¶VUDQJHKDVDOUHDG\SURYHQLQVẊFLHQWWRFRYHUFXUUHQWSULFHVWKDW
KDYHÀXFWXDWHGLQRXUYLHZEDVHGXSRQWKHVDPHW\SHVRIULVNVWKDW6KHOOKDVFRQVLGHUHGRYHUWLPH
This should be of concern to investors since it is not on account of the new demand risks posed by 
technologies such as electric vehicle penetration, or the synergies between EVs and solar/battery 
VWRUDJHKDYHQRW\HWFDSWXUHGVLJQL¿FDQWPDUNHWVKDUH82 
0RUHRYHUWKHVFUHHQLQJSULFHUHYHDOVOLWWOHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHSURMHFWHGDQGDFWXDOFRVWVRI6KHOO¶V
development projects.  Without such information, investors are hard-pressed to gauge risks to the 
SUR¿WDELOLW\RI6KHOO¶VIXWXUHSURGXFWLRQ
We also set a project screening value for CO2 to evaluate the potential 
economic impact of stricter CO2 related regulatory changes.  This 
VFUHHQLQJYDOXHLVFXUUHQWO\WRQQHRI&2HPLWWHG7KLVLV
applied as the economic base case across all of our projects.  For short 
OLIHDVVHWVRUDVVHWVZLWKRXWVLJQL¿FDQW&2HPLVVLRQVWKHH[WHQWRI
the analysis is limited to the screening value.  For longer life assets, 
RUWKRVHZLWKKLJKHUFDUERQULVNSUR¿OHVNQRZQDV³FDUERQFULWLFDO
projects,”, more extensive work is done.83
—Royal Dutch Shell
We interpret846KHOO¶V&2SULFHDVDSSO\LQJWRXSVWUHDPHPLVVLRQVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKH[WUDFWLRQZKLOH
ignoring the potential downward pressure on prices that would likely be associated with carbon 
SULFLQJIRUHQGXVHUV7KLVXQGHUVWDWHVWKHSRWHQWLDOWKUHDWWRUHWXUQVIURP6KHOO¶VDQGRWKHUPDMRUV¶
projects from action on carbon. 
6KHOO¶VXVHRID&2SULFHVHHPVWRUHÀHFWDFRQVHQVXVRIWKHVWURQJOLNHOLKRRGRILQFUHDVLQJPHDVXUHV
to reduce carbon pollution, suggesting the “direction of travel” for future climate policy – that 
HPLVVLRQVUHJXODWLRQZLOOLQFUHDVLQJO\VTXHH]HWKHPDUJLQVRIIRVVLOIXHOSURMHFWV+RZHYHUDW
$40/tonne CO2, the economic impact on “upstream” activities amounts to only $1-2/bbl for most 
FRQYHQWLRQDORLOSURMHFWV²DOHYHOGZDUIHGE\UHFHQWPDUNHWÀXFWXDWLRQV85  This suggests that, despite 
SHUFHLYLQJWKDWFOLPDWHFKDQJHLVDVLJQL¿FDQWSUREOHPDQGWKDWDFWLRQPD\EHWDNHQ6KHOOEHOLHYHV




rigorous analysis of project risks would thoroughly evaluate direct impacts on project costs and 
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of analysis,86 but greater disclosure around how such analyses are performed would inform investors 
as to how rigorously Shell is integrating climate policy risk into its project analyses.
$VQRWHGLQVHFWLRQ6KHOOVXSSRUWHGDVKDUHKROGHUUHVROXWLRQ¿OHGE\WKH$LPLQJIRU$FRDOLWLRQ
WKDWSDVVHGRYHUZKHOPLQJO\DWWKH$QQXDO*HQHUDO0HHWLQJWKDWUHTXLUHVLWWRLPSURYHLWV
reporting.  Following through on that resolution presents an opportunity for Shell to address many of 
these issues.
We also address the potential for future climate-related controls, 
including the potential for restriction on emissions, through the use 





governments may take over the Outlook period relating to the exploration, development, production, 
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQRUXVHRIFDUERQEDVHGIXHOV¶877KLVSUR[\FDUERQFRVWLV³HPEHGGHG´LQ([[RQ¶V
2XWORRNIRU(QHUJ\ZKLFKLV([[RQ¶VVLQJOHVFHQDULRGHPDQGDQDO\VLV7KURXJKWKHSURMHFWHG
carbon cost varies from less than $20/tCO2 in some regions (e.g. Africa and the Middle East) to as 
high as $80/tCO2 in other regions.  This level of regional detail helps investors to understand how 
companies are integrating climate risk into their capital investment decisions.  However, like Shell, it 
LVQRWWUDQVSDUHQWKRZ([[RQ¶V&2SULFHLVDSSOLHG88  For example, it is not clear whether the price 
is applied along the value chain of oil production, (including the largest portion of emissions which 
come from consumption of the products).
3.4 SUMMARIZING: QUANTIFYING THE DISCLOSURE RESULTS AS AT JUNE 2014: 








iii) the 20 responses to the Carbon Asset Risk (CAR) letters. 
This resulted in 81 companies being included in the synthesis analysis as a sample representative of 
WKHIRVVLOIXHOLQGXVWU\RLODQGJDVFRPSDQLHVDQGFRDOFRPSDQLHV8QGHUWKLVDSSURDFKVL[
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Conclusions:
,QVẊFLHQWFOLPDWHUHODWHGULVNUHSRUWLQJ
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) outlines that the role of capital 
PDUNHWVUHJXODWRUVLVWRµSURWHFWLQYHVWRUVPDLQWDLQIDLUḢFLHQWDQGWUDQVSDUHQWPDUNHWVDQG
VHHNWRDGGUHVVV\VWHPLFULVN¶RQWKRVHH[FKDQJHVFRPSDQLHVXVHWRUDLVHIXQGV,WLVLQWHQGHGWKDW
corporate reporting achieve this aim. While some steps have been taken to address increasingly 
pressing climate-related risks, including the SEC guidance, the UK mandatory greenhouse gas 





An energy transition is underway as stakeholders increasingly recognise the potential severity of 
future climate-related constraints. Coal prices are at a perilous low as demand for heavy polluting 
FRDO¿UHGSRZHUIDOWHUVDQGRLODQGJDVFDSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUHVDUHVSLUDOOLQJWRHYHQPDLQWDLQWKHVWDWXV
TXRRISURGXFWLRQOHYHOV$OOWKHZKLOHWKHVXSSO\FRVWRIUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\WHFKQRORJLHVFRQWLQXHV
to fall. If the resulting potential downside risks to future fossil fuel demand are not disclosed in 
FRPSDQ\GLVFORVXUHVDQGUHJXODWRU\¿OLQJVFXUUHQWDQGSURVSHFWLYHLQYHVWPHQWVUXQWKHULVNRI
destroying shareholder value or depressing group returns – what Carbon Tracker terms “wasting 
capital in stranded assets.”
RIVDPSOHGIRVVLOIXHOFRPSDQLHVUHFRJQLVHLWLVDULVN\EXVLQHVV«
7KHVDPSOHRIFRDORLODQGJDVFRPSDQLHVDQDO\VHGLQWKLVUHSRUWXQHTXLYRFDOO\GLVSOD\DQ
awareness of climate change as an issue and a belief that it could poses a risk to their business. 86% 
of companies consider climate change to pose physical risks, while 99% of the sample deem climate-
related regulation to be a risk.
«%XWSHUSHWXDWHXQFHUWDLQW\ZLWKDODFNRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
In spite of this high level of awareness of climate-related risk, companies are failing to connect the 
dots when it comes to applying this knowledge through risk management measures. 80% of oil and 
JDVFRPSDQLHVGLGQRWGLVSOD\HYLGHQFHRIUXQQLQJFOLPDWHVFHQDULRDQDO\VHVRIGL̆HUHQWWHPSHUDWXUH
increases due to climate change, with only 10% of companies going on to stress-test projects against 
conditions similar to a 2°C future. Approximately the same proportion of coal companies conduct 
climate scenario analyses, with only one, however, disclosing evidence of stress-testing against a 2°C 
outcome. 







companies are consistent with those made in other voluntary reporting mechanisms - in essence 
WRHQVXUHZKDWDFRPSDQ\VD\VWRLQYHVWRUVUHÀHFWVZKDWLVEHLQJLPSOHPHQWHG2XUDQDO\VLVRI86
listed fossil fuel companies shows that while there appears to be a consensus that climate-related 
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UHJXODWRU\ULVNVDUHWKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWWKHUHLVGLVFUHSDQF\LQWKHSHUFHSWLRQRISK\VLFDOULVNV
in particular between company annual reports and voluntary disclosures. Corporate reports must 




This research seeks investors to call for a greater focus from fossil fuel companies on their relative 
risk and resilience to a carbon-constrained scenario.
5HJXODWLQJFDSLWDOPDUNHWWRPDQDJHFOLPDWHUHODWHGULVNV
We recommend:
• Companies to disclose, either voluntarily or due to regulatory amendments, in their regulatory 
¿OLQJVSUHIHUDEO\XQGHUDVHSDUDWHKHDGLQJ
• A descriptions of their assessment of climate-related risks, including aggregate demand and 
SULFHLPSDFWV
 7KHFDUERQHPEHGGHGLQWKHLUFRDORLODQGJDVUHVHUYHVDQGUHVRXUFHV
• Details related to resilience in a low price/demand scenario, such as the parameters set out in 
VWUHVVWHVWVLQGL̆HUHQWSULFHGHPDQGVFHQDULRV




informed and pressure for mandatory changes grows.
6HFXULWLHVUHJXODWRUVDQG¿QDQFLDOUHSRUWVWDQGDUGVHWWLQJERGLHV
• Increase scrutiny of existing regulations and guidance of coal, oil and gas disclosures based on 
H[LVWLQJDXWKRULW\
• Scrutiny should include ensuring that fossil fuel companies provide clear descriptions of their 
assessment of climate-related risks, including aggregate demand and price impacts associated 
with a low-carbon scenario, and that those assessments are consistent with other company 
VWDWHPHQWVRQFOLPDWHULVN
• Issue guidance to interpret existing standards related to carbon asset stranding so that 




and resources of a company.  
9ROXQWDU\UHSRUWLQJJXLGHOLQHVHWWHUV
Develop technical guidance on reporting the carbon dioxide emissions potential of reserves to 
SURYLGHDIRUZDUGORRNLQJLQGLFDWRUHQVXULQJFRPSDWLELOLW\ZLWK¿QDQFLDOUHSRUWLQJVWDQGDUG
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Figure 16: Carbon Tracker Analysis of corporate responses - regulatory risk
Figure 17: Carbon Tracker analysis of corporate responses  - substitution risk
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Figure 18: Carbon Tracker analysis of corporate responses – assessing climate risks
)LJXUH&DUERQ7UDFNHUDQDO\VLVRIFRPSDQLHV±ULVNVLJQL¿FDQFH
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Figure 20: CDP Climate Change Questionnaire
Figure 21: CDP Investor Expectations Governance
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Figure 22: CDP Strategy Considerations
4.  D IVE STMENT 
Divestment is particularly dependent on the mandate of the asset owner or fund as discussed in the 
framework. Simply put, many are prohibited from divesting without seeking a mandate change.90
'LYHVWPHQWKDVDWWUDFWHGDJRRGGHDORISXEOLFLW\DQGIRFXVIROORZLQJ%LOO0F.LEEHQDQGRUJ¶V
H̆RUWVWRSURPRWHLWDVDZD\RIIRUFLQJFKDQJHRQIRVVLOIXHOFRPSDQLHV$VWKHUHSRUWE\WKH6PLWK
School Stranded Assets program sets out clearly, the pure economic arguments for divestment 
DUHQRWDOZD\VFOHDULQWHUPVRIFRUSRUDWHLPSDFWEXWWKHLPSDFWWKURXJK³VWLJPDWL]DWLRQ´FDQ
be substantial. That said, companies such as Peabody are pointing to the movement in its risk 
disclosures as a factor that may “adversely” impact the company and its share price, and the 
$XVWUDOLDQPLQLQJLQGXVWU\KDVJRQHVRIDUDVWRVXJJHVWWKDWFRPSDQLHVWKLQNDERXWGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQ
into renewables and low carbon technologies. Looking at the number of institutions and the prestige 
of those who have divested, this is clearly an area that can claim action. In addition, indexes and 
IXQGVR̆HULQJUHGXFHGH[SRVXUHWRIRVVLOIXHOVKDYHSHUIRUPHGZHOOLQUHFHQW\HDUVDQGSRLQWWRWKH
economics of some types of divestment from an investor perspective. Here are the primary sources 
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4.1. BACKGROUND
As the report by the Smith School Stranded Assets program91 sets out clearly:
 …direct impacts on equity or debt are likely to be limited. The 
maximum possible capital that might be divested from the fossil fuel 
companies represents a relatively small pool of funds. In contrast, 
the market capitalisation of fossil fuel companies, particularly 
integrated oil and gas players, is several times higher. Even if the 
maximum possible capital was divested from fossil fuel companies, 
WKHLUVKDUHVSULFHVDUHXQOLNHO\WRVX̆HUSUHFLSLWRXVGHFOLQHVRYHUDQ\
length of time. Financial markets are volatile. Daily swings as high 
as ±5% are not uncommon even for large stocks such as ExxonMobil. 
Sizeable withdrawals are likely to escape the attention of fossil fuel 
management since oil and gas stocks are some of the world’s most 
OLTXLGSXEOLFHTXLWLHV«:HDFNQRZOHGJHWKDWGLUHFWH̆HFWVRQFRDO
valuations are likely to be more substantial. Coal companies represent 
a small fraction of market capitalisation of fossil fuel companies and 
coal stocks are also less liquid. Divestment announcements are thus 
more likely to impact coal stock prices since alternative investors 
cannot be as easily found as in the oil and gas sector.
+RZHYHUWKH\¿QGLWLVLQUHODWLRQWR³VWLJPDWLVDWLRQ´WKDW'LYHVWPHQWFDQKDYHLWVODUJHVWLPSDFW
'LYHVWPHQWFDPSDLJQVZLOOSUREDEO\EHDWWKHLUPRVWH̆HFWLYHLQ
triggering a process of stigmatisation of fossil fuel companies. We 
¿QGWKDWHYHQLIWKHGLUHFWLPSDFWVRIGLYHVWPHQWRXWÀRZVDUHOLPLWHG
LQWKHVKRUWWHUPWKHFDPSDLJQVZLOOFDXVHQHXWUDOHTXLW\DQGRU
debt investors to lower their expectations of fossil fuel companies’ 
QHWFDVKÀRZVLQWKHORQJWHUP7KHSURFHVVE\ZKLFKXQFHUWDLQW\
surrounding the future of fossil fuel industry will increase is through 
stigmatisation. In particular, the fossil fuel divestment campaign will 
increase legislative uncertainty and potentially also lead to multiples’ 
compression causing more permanent damage to the companies’ 
HQWHUSULVHYDOXHV)LQDOO\ZH¿QGWKDWVWLJPDWLVDWLRQZKLOHOLNHO\
to cost fossil fuel companies billions, is unlikely to threaten their 
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Figure 23: Smith School analysis of divestment stigmatization
4.2 SIZING THE MOVEMENT
7KHVL]HRIWKH'LYHVWPHQWPRYHPHQWLVWUDFNHGE\DQXPEHURIRUJDQL]DWLRQV+RZHYHUWKHSURSHU
metric—number of institutions divesting, AuM divested, etc. along with what screen is used—remains 




weighted average impacts available, but simple counts are available from several sources.
4.2.1 The Go Fossil Free Movement92
Go Fossil Free tracks divestment commitments and currently shows 397 institutions that have 
pledged to divest at some level.93 The plot below shows the types of institutions that are divesting, 
GRPLQDWHGE\IRXQGDWLRQVIDLWKEDVHGJURXSVSXEOLFIXQGVDQGRWKHUJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQV
and universities/schools. According to a report released in September 2015, the total amount of 
investment funds now managed by portfolio managers who have pledged to divest has reached $2.6 
WULOOLRQKRZHYHUWKHUHSRUWGRHVQRWH[SODLQWKHDFWXDODPRXQWRIIXQGVWKDWKDYHEHHQGLUHFWO\
divested, what percentage of these assets are currently invested in fossil fuels, or what types of 
screens are being applied to these funds.
 5HSRUWVUHJDUGLQJGLYHVWPHQWDUHDYDLODEOHIURP)RVVLO)UHH,QYHVWDWKWWSJRIRVVLOIUHHRUJFRPPLWPHQWV
 $VRI6HSWHPEHU
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Figure 24: Divestment by Type of Institution
 
4.2.2 The Norwegian Example
7KH1RUZHJLDQVRYHUHLJQZHDOWKIXQG¶VGLYHVWPHQWIURPFRPSDQLHVZLWKJUHDWHUWKDQRI
revenues from coal has been one of the biggest divestment announcements to date. The following 
EULH¿QJZDVUHVHDUFKHGDQGZULWWHQE\8UJHZDOGDQGFRSXEOLVKHGZLWK*UHHQSHDFH1RUZD\DQGWKH
Future in Our Hands.94 It also shows that divestment from coal is a key starting focus for many asset 
owners.
Visitors opening the English language webpage of the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) are greeted 
by a stark image and a strong message these days. A photo of a colossal lump of coal and the 
IROORZLQJDQQRXQFHPHQW¶7KH6WRUWLQJKDVPDGHWKHXQDQLPRXVGHFLVLRQWRSXOOWKH*RYHUQPHQW
3HQVLRQ)XQG*OREDO*3)*RXWRIFRDO¶
The gist of our assessment is that the amount of coal holdings to be excluded by the new criteria is 
PXFKKLJKHUWKDQWKH)LQDQFH0LQLVWU\¶VHVWLPDWH7KHDQQH[RIWKLVEULH¿QJFRQWDLQVDGLYHVWPHQW
list of 118 companies whose share of coal business is over 30% and 4 companies, whose coal 
H[SDQVLRQSURMHFWVDUHVRVLJQL¿FDQWLQUHODWLRQWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVL]HRUSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQSRUWIROLR
WKDWWKH\DOVRZDUUDQWDQH[FOXVLRQ&RPSDQLHVZHUHRQO\SXWRQWKHOLVWLIWKHUHZDVVẊFLHQW
documentation that they meet the divestment criteria. 
And now, the big number: The GPFG’s investments in these FRPSDQLHV total NOK 67.2 
ELOOLRQRU¼ELOOLRQ. This is the biggest divestment action to date from the coal industry and 
sets a new standard for investors worldwide.
4.2.3 Index Providers.
Divestment can also take place by adopting indexes that exclude fossil fuel companies in some way. 
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For example, in late 2014 MSCI launched their MSCI ACWI Ex Fossil Fuel index, based on the MSCI 
ACWI parent index and including large and mid-cap stocks across 23 Developed Markets (DM) and 
23 Emerging Markets (EM) countries*. The index represents the performance of the broad market 
while excluding companies that own oil, gas and coal reserves. It is a benchmark for investors who 
aim to eliminate fossil fuel reserves exposure from their investments due to concerns about the 
contribution of these reserves to climate change.  
7KHSHUIRUPDQFHRIVXFKLQGH[HVFRPSDUHGWREHQFKPDUNLVDQLPSRUWDQWTXHVWLRQIRULQYHVWRUV
considering divestment. Analysis to date shows that performance can match or exceed benchmark 
RYHU\HDUWLPHIUDPHV)RULQVWDQFHWKH¿JXUHEHORZVKRZV06&,$&:,([)RVVLO)XHOYV06&,
ACWI on a 5-year timeframe.
Figure 25: MSCI Fossil Fuel Free Index
Research by Sustainable Insight Capital Management has also examined the performance of three 
GL̆HUHQWIRVVLOIXHOIUHHSRUWIROLRVDOODJDLQVWWKH6	3,QGH[6,&0¿QGVRXWSHUIRUPDQFH
across 1, 3, and 5 year periods compared to S&P 500. They also highlight a number of important 
considerations the Asset Owner and Asset Manager should contemplate as they embark on the path 
of fossil fuel free investing. 
7KH\QRWHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIGH¿QLWLRQVDVKLJKOLJKWHGDERYH
$VZLWKDOOLQYHVWPHQWVFOHDUGH¿QLWLRQVDUHQHFHVVDU\7KLVLV
particularly true with fossil fuel free investments where a wide range 
of interpretations are possible, in turn, giving rise to a variety of 
possible investment approaches. Investors must choose whether to opt 
for the simplicity and clarity of a negative screen or choose the best-
in-class approach, perhaps with a carbon tilt, or a highly discretional 
thematic investment process. Simply by imposing a negative screen, 
investors can end up omitting anywhere between 11% to close to 20% 
of the S&P 500 Index.
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4.2.4 Making an impact on corporations
As the Smith School paper cited above suggests, the main impact of divestment is likely to be through 
WKHVWLJPDWL]DWLRQRIIRVVLOIXHOFRPSDQLHV:HSURYLGHWZRH[DPSOHVKHUH)LUVWFHUWDLQO\3HDERG\
Energy95 in its risk disclosures seems to take the movement seriously, although this should be 
XQGHUVWRRGZLWKLQDIXOOOHJDOIUDPHZRUN)XUWKHUWKH\FLWHWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWWKLVFRXOGD̆HFWWKHP
in capital markets: 
Concerns about the environmental impacts of coal combustion, 
including perceived impacts on global climate issues, are resulting 
in increased regulation of coal combustion in many jurisdictions, 




our products or our securities.
Extracts from the following article96 in the context of the Australian Mining Industry are interesting 
IRUVHYHUDOUHDVRQV,WVKRZVWKHFRDOLQGXVWU\LVDZDUHRIWKHLPSDFWRI³VWLJPDWL]DWLRQ´,WVKRZVDQ
industry looking to counter that but it also shows an open discussion of alternatives to coal and the 
SRWHQWLDOQHHGVIRUGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQE\FRPSDQLHV7KLVGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWGLYHVWPHQWLVDOVRIRVWHULQJ
the type of dialogue many investors are having through direct engagement:
It’s become very clear that something has to be done. Anti-mining 
protesters have developed an unprecedented level of sophistication in 
their approach to environmental activism… Although the traditional 
methods with protesters chaining themselves to trees and machinery 
will always be in vogue - with badges of honour to be won and 
treasured in the memories of those who were there on the ground - we 
are now seeing new social waves of protest in the form of the fossil-
fuel divestment movement … Mining is a long-term business, and 
if companies can open their scope to include new developments for 
future capitalisation, so much the better.  By investing in alternative 
energy technologies that may fall under the purview of conventional 
businesses, technologies that might even be considered a threat 
from traditional points of view, then it is impossible to divest from 
that company without divesting from their operations relating to 
alternative energy … What is required is a holistic view of energy 
production, and a preparedness to bring those projects supported by 
the divestment movements into the fossil fuel miner’s fold, with a view 
WRHQKDQFLQJWKRVHWHFKQRORJLHVIRUWKHEHQH¿WRIWKHLQGXVWU\DQG
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5.  INVE STOR PORTFOL IOS AND SERV ICE  PROV IDERS
5.1 AODP OVERVIEW
7KHUROHRILQYHVWRUVDVVHWRZQHUVDQGDVVHWPDQDJHUVDQGSRWHQWLDOO\IDPLO\ṘFHV²UHPDLQV
central to the evaluation and management of CAR. Managing risk has been evident in the 
(QJDJHPHQW'LVFORVXUHDQG'LYHVWPHQWFKDSWHUV,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHVHSULPDULO\TXDOLWDWLYHWRROVZH
QRZWXUQPRUHGLUHFWO\WRTXDQWLWDWLYHPHWKRGVLQYHVWRUVFDQXVHLQWHUPVRIFDUERQIRRWSULQWLQJDQG
stress-testing at the portfolio level.
Here the available information on CAR uptake is less encouraging, though recent evidence suggests 
practices are slowly spreading. The Asset Owners Disclosure Project (AODP) tracks investor 
disclosure in this area. While this is not an exhaustive survey of all investors and does not include 
$VVHW0DQDJHUV$2'3¶VHYLGHQFH)LJXUHVKRZVWKDWRXWVLGHRIDKDQGIXORIOHDGHUVWKHUHLVDORQJ
way to go to see investors actually stress testing at the portfolio level on a widespread basis.
Figure 26: Asset Owners Disclosure Project – AODP Global Climate Index 201597
 $VVHW2ZQHUV'LVFORVXUH3URMHFW³*OREDO&OLPDWH,QGH[´DYDLODEOHDWKWWSDRGSURMHFWQHWLPDJHVGRFV$2'3*/2%$/&/,0$7(,1'(;YLHZSGI
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Having said that, a number of tools are available and uptake is increasing for both risk and 





assessing exposure or screening and scenario-based tools designed to assess the impact of change in 
risk factors (technology, policy, market, etc.). 
5.2 SERVICE PROVIDERS 
)LJXUH7\SHVRITXDQWLWDWLYH&$5PRGHOV 
6RXUFH0RGL¿HGIURP81(3),:5DQGG,,&'&&OLPDW81(4,QTXLU\  






Bottom-up (Asset/operator level) &RUSRUDWHFDUERQGLVFORVXUH&'3
&HUHVHWF





Top-down (Portfolio level) 3RUWIROLRIRRWSULQWLQJ6RXWK3ROH
7UXFRVW06&,RWKHUV100
Portfolio Stress test (Mercer)
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test models like Mercer’s). 
7KLVFKDSWHUZLOOEULHÀ\LQWURGXFHUHFHQWTXDQWLWDWLYHPRGHOLQJDWSRUWIROLRVFDOHLQFOXGLQJWKH
FXUUHQWVWDWHRISRUWIROLRFDUERQIRRWSULQWLQJQH[WVHFWLRQDQGVWUHVVWHVWLQJ¿QDO6HFWLRQ




























goal of limiting climate change and the contribution to the realization 
of the energy and ecological transition103
101 The reader is encouraged to consult 2dII (2014), UNEP FI/WRI/2dII (2015) , GICCC (2015)
102  More information here: UN PRI Montreal Pledge and UNEP FI/CDP Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition.
103 Translation from 2dII (2015).
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7KXVLQDGGLWLRQWRWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUGLVFORVLQJ&$5DQGSRUWIROLRFDUERQIRRWSULQWLQYHVWRUV
DUHDOVRUHTXLUHGWRUHSRUWRQWKHLUSRUWIROLR¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHHQHUJ\WUDQVLWLRQDUHTXLUHPHQW
WKDWZLOOOLNHO\UHTXLUHLQQRYDWLRQRQWKHSDUWRILQYHVWRUVDQGDVVHWPDQDJHUVWRPHHW104 The Law 
DOVRLQFOXGHVSURYLVLRQVUHODWHGWROLVWHGFRPSDQ\GLVFORVXUHVLQFOXGLQJUHTXLULQJ&$5UHODWHG
GLVFORVXUHWKH¿QDQFLDOULVNVUHODWHGWRWKHH̆HFWVRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGWKHPHDVXUHVDGRSWHG
by the company to reduce them, by implementing a low-carbon strategy in every component of its 
activities. An implementation decree is expected by the end of the year, and the stringency of the 
UHTXLUHGGLVFORVXUHVZLOOOLNHO\GHSHQGRQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVLQWKLVGHFUHH
Partly driven by these developments, notably the Montreal Pledge, the portfolio footprinting 
market has expanded considerably over the last year. Discussions with market leaders and surveys 
by Novethic105 suggest around 60 large institutional investors in 2013 have grown to nearly 200 
FRQGXFWLQJWKLVW\SHRIDQDO\VLVJHQHUDOO\IRFXVHGRQHTXLWLHVSRUWIROLRV0RUHLQWHUHVWLQJO\LWVHHPV
WKDWWKHPDUNHWLVEHJLQQLQJWRPRYHEH\RQGµWKHXVXDOVXVSHFWV¶SUHGRPLQDQWO\SXEOLFSHQVLRQ
funds and religious groups to include more mainstream funds and asset managers. Industry experts 
consulted for this study report that the motivation for footprinting portfolios remains a mixture of 
moral/SRI type motivations and risk, though more clients who may have a predominantly moral 
driver are beginning to ask about risk exposure. 
,QFUHDVLQJO\HTXLW\SRUWIROLRIRRWSULQWLQJLVDOVREHLQJFRQGXFWHGDORQJVLGHRWKHUULVNUHOHYDQW




combination of CAR-relevant services, including assessment of: 
• Risk exposure from current carbon intensity
• Risk exposure from potential future emissions (fossil fuel reserves)
• Exposure to Clean Technologies as a share of total 
• Some level of scenario/regulatory analysis 
• Scoring against benchmarks on GHG emissions governance and target 
implementation for individual companies and their position relative to peers.
$OOSURYLGHUVDOVRR̆HUVHUYLFHVWREHQFKPDUNSRUWIROLRVWRFRPPRQO\XVHGLQYHVWPHQWLQGLFHVVXFK
DVWKH6	3672;;HWF$JURZLQJWUHQGLQWKH¿HOGLVWKHFUHDWLRQRIORZFDUERQDQGIRVVLO
fuel exclusion indices used for alternative benchmarking, as discussed in the divestment section 
above.
5.2.2 Portfolio Stress Testing
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integrates these in the modeling process alongside more traditional market assumptions, scenarios, 
and risk factors. Importantly, the risk factors capture indicators for policy and technology, similar to 
other CAR assessments, but also with physical impacts driven by catastrophic incidents (for example, 
VWRUPZLOG¿UHDQGÀRRGDQGORQJWHUPZHDWKHUFKDQJHVD̆HFWLQJNH\UHVRXUFHVIRUH[DPSOH
water). 
The results provide investors with an insight to potential impacts on return distribution expectations 
IRUWKH6$$HQDEOLQJWKHPWRH[DPLQHWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIGL̆HUHQWFOLPDWHVFHQDULRVLQWKHFRQWH[W
of their current asset allocation, and consider resulting actions and opportunities, such as:
• Developing a formal point of view on climate risk and associated implementation strategy 
• Identifying risk, and risk management solutions, at the asset class and sector level (e.g. real 
asset physical risk exposure across the portfolio)
 )UDPLQJTXHVWLRQVRQVHFWRUOHYHOLPSDFWVZKLFKDVVHWRZQHUVDQGFRQVXOWDQWVFDQXVHLQ
their oversight of external managers, and managers can use in their oversight of companies
• Considering opportunities to access low carbon, high growth investments across asset classes
• Developing an appropriate stakeholder relations strategy
)LJXUH,PSDFWRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHVFHQDULRRQWKH0HGLDQ$QQXDO5HWXUQ,PSDFWRYHU\HDUV6RXUFH0HUFHU
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APPENDIX 1:  COMPANIE S  THAT RECE IVED THE  INVE STOR 
CARBON ASSE T  R ISK LE T TER
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YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2014 Carbon Asset Risk As You Sow 30%
2015 Carbon Asset Risk As You Sow 
BP
YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME




YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME




YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2013 Carbon Asset Risk Christopher Reynolds 
Foundation

2014 Carbon Asset Risk As You Sow Challenged-Omitted
2015 Return capital to investors 
rather than continue to invest in 
high risk projects
As You Sow 
CONOCOPHILLIPS
YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2015 Executive Compensation linked 
to ESG and Carbon Asset Risk




YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2014 Carbon Asset Risk New York State Comptroller 




YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2015 Carbon Asset Risk Connecticut Retirement Plans 
and Trust Funds

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EXXONMOBIL
YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2013 Climate Risk Report Christopher Reynolds 
Foundation
Omitted




Withdrawn; Company addressing 
through further engagement
2014 Carbon Asset Risk Report Arjuna Capital Withdrawn; Company addressed 
with Carbon Asset Risk Report
2015 Return capital to shareholders Arjuna Capital Omitted
HESS
YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2014 Carbon Asset Risk &RQQHFWLFXW2I¿FHRIWKH6WDWH
Treasurer






YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2015 Carbon Asset Risk )LUVW$I¿UPDWLYH)LQDQFLDO
1HWZRUN//&





YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME




YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME




YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2015 Carbon Asset Risk Presbyterian Church (USA) 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL
YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME





YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2015 Carbon Asset Risk Aiming for A Coalition 
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COAL
ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES
YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2013 Climate Risk Report United Unitarian Universalist 
Association of Congregations
18%




YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2013 Carbon Asset Risk As You Sow 
2014 Carbon Asset Risk As You Sow 
2015 Carbon Asset Risk As You Sow 
PEABODY ENERGY CORPORATION
YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME





YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME




YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2015 Changing Business Model New York City Comptroller 
FIRST ENERGY
YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2014 Adopt policies to reduce 
HPLVVLRQVLQOLQHZLWK86
goals and address Carbon 
Asset Risk
New York State Comptroller Withdrawn
SOUTHERN COMPANY
YEAR SUBJECT SHAREHOLDER OUTCOME
2014 Adopt policies to reduce 
HPLVVLRQVLQOLQHZLWK86
goals and address Carbon 
Asset Risk
As You Sow Withdrawn
56 | WWW.CERES.ORG 
APPENDIX 3:  INST ITUT IONS D IVE ST ING
In addition to divestment commitments, a key movement has been to promote the reinvestment 
of funds to climate solutions. Divest-invest is an NGO-led pledge In terms of the names of key 
institutions, Divest- Invest lists the following signatories, who have pledged not only divestment 
but also the reinvestment of 5% of their portfolio to climate solutions.106  Note that the number of 
institutions—currently 104—is fully contained in the 397 commitments counted by Go Fossil Free.
KWWSGLYHVWLQYHVWRUJSKLODQWKURS\VLJQDWRULHV
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